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
 
 
In January 2010, a wholly deserving father was granted a residence order. 
As a consequence S, his twelve-year-old son, would have to leave his 
mother‟s home and go to live with him and his new family.  Seven months 
later, in July 2010, the father left the court in tears having accepted that it was 
futile to continue with his struggle to activate the residence order. S had 
indulged in such negative behaviour, described in court as indicative of 
serious and entrenched parental alienation,
1
 that the father gave in to the 
child‟s demands to remain with his mother, and a consent order was made to 
that effect. One month later, HHJ Bellamy, somewhat unusually given the 
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nature of a consent order, decided to recount in full the history of the father‟s 
attempts over a long period of time to have a meaningful relationship with his 
son. The judge explained his reasons for doing so: 
 
“This has been an extraordinary case. The two Court of Appeal 
decisions attracted wide publicity. There has also been significant 
professional interest. Against that background I was persuaded that it 
would not be appropriate to end this case simply by the court 
approving an order agreed between the parties. … Mr Vater, counsel 
for the local authority, made the point that the story did not end with 
the last hearing before the Court of Appeal. He submitted that „before 
that decision or those preceding it are relied upon in other, similar 
cases, either by any experts for the purposes of research or lawyers in 
support of their cases, the full story should be recorded.‟ I agree. That 
is the purpose of this judgment.”2 
 
Although, Bellamy HHJ, in Re S, showed sensitivity and empathy towards 
the father, his judgments did nothing to further the father‟s just demands. 
They reveal the impotency of the law and the court process where a child 
demonstrates intractable parental alienation.
3
 They are judgments which all 
parents contemplating litigation should read so that they are made aware of 
the limitations of law should they decide to engage in disputes over a child‟s 
residence or contact. All too frequently, these disputes are a form of 
displacement warfare for the unresolved problems of the adults‟ relationship, 
and have little to do with a desire to ensure their children‟s welfare.  
The parents, in Re S, were both professional people. Their relationship had 
ended in 1998, not long before S was born. When S was fifteen months old, 
the father applied for contact but S was aged four by the time contact actually 
took place. Progress was made, and the father and his wife succeeded in 
having S to stay on alternate weekends and took him on holiday with his two 
half brothers. When S was aged eight, these arrangements fell apart. The 
mother‟s attitude to contact, which had never been positive, degenerated still 
further. Part of the reason for her increased hostility was because the father, 
perhaps unwisely in the judge‟s view, had organised DNA testing to make 
clear to her that he was S‟s biological father. The father had also applied to 
the court for an order permitting him to change S‟s name, had requested that 
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he be allowed to send him to a private school, and had failed to return S to his 
mother after a visit. The mother reacted in a very negative manner, and by 
implication fostered a similar reaction in S. She ensured that S had extra 
curricula activities after school and every weekend; that way, there would be 
no time for contact between S and his father. She made no effort to encourage 
S to respond to his father‟s letters or telephone calls. She acquiesced in his 
rudeness to his father on the telephone, and gifts to S from the father and his 
family remained unacknowledged. Numerous court hearings were held but the 
father was unable to re-establish contact with S whose alienation had became 
intractable.   
In December 2009, the father decided that the only way a meaningful 
relationship between him and S could be re-established was for S to live with 
him and his family. He applied for a residence order which HHJ Bellamy 
granted.  It was a difficult decision to make; he had been faced with a 
difference of opinion between the original guardian ad litem, who had become 
over emotionally involved with S and had lost her sense of objectivity, and the 
expert appointed by the court, a consultant child psychiatrist. The guardian 
believed that S was traumatised by the dispute between his parents and the 
legal proceedings; that the court proceedings should be brought to an end; that 
contact between S and his father should cease, and S should remain with his 
mother and undergo therapy. The psychiatrist disagreed; he believed that 
therapy would be pointless unless it took place alongside contact between S 
and his father. He thought that the mother had opposed and undermined 
contact for too long; the guardian‟s approach would allow her behaviour and 
S‟s alienation to continue. He viewed S‟s expression of his wishes and 
feelings as irrational, and that they should not to be taken into account.  In his 
view, the father would have to be very persistent with S in the initial stages of 
renewed contact and not give in, even if this meant that S might threaten to 
sabotage the new arrangement by refusing to eat or communicate. In his 
experience S would cease such behaviour within a day or two. 
HHJ Bellamy reiterated the principle that any decision about S‟s residence 
must be taken in his best interests under the Children Act 1989 s 1. He 
accepted that s 1(3) of the Act and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 1989, did not permit him to disregard S‟s views about 
where and with whom he should live. He quoted Butler Sloss LJ‟s words in 
Re S (Minors) (Access: Religious Upbringing)
4
 relating to the views of 
children aged 13 and 11: “Nobody should dictate to children of this age, 
because one is dealing with their emotions, their lives and they are not 
packages to be moved around. They are people to be treated with respect.” 
However, he believed that S‟s wishes had to be considered in the light of 
his age and understanding, and his long-term parental alienation. There was a 
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suggestion that S‟s wishes and feelings were not entirely reliable. He had 
shown some limited signs of warming towards his father, a man whom the 
judge regarded favourably, if occasionally a little lacking in foresight. The 
mother was seen as meeting S‟s general needs to a high standard, but that, on 
her own admission, she had lost control of S, and was unable (or unwilling) to 
ensure that he had contact with his father. Balancing all the relevant factors, 
the judge concluded that S had suffered harm as a consequence of his parental 
alienation. S had distorted and unreal views of his father and his paternal 
family; he maintained that he hated him and that he was a monster. Were this 
alienation to continue, it could damage S‟s future welfare and lead to 
academic under achievement and relationship difficulties. The father was 
more likely to be able to meet the full range of S‟s needs than the mother. He 
had recognised where he had gone wrong and the need for change, and had 
acted on it. He would encourage contact between S and his mother. She was 
unlikely to do the same for S and his father if S were to remain in her care, 
therefore, a residence order was the appropriate way forward.  
The mother immediately made an application to appeal the decision; it 
was dismissed by the Court of Appeal,
5
 and the case was sent back to HHJ 
Bellamy to decide the best means of proceeding with the transfer of S to his 
father‟s home. The judge‟s plan was immediately derailed because, not 
surprisingly, the mother complained of chest pains and was admitted to 
hospital on the day the handover was due to take place. There was nothing 
seriously wrong with her and she was discharged from hospital later that day. 
A further plan was made, and a new guardian ad litem and a solicitor for S 
were appointed. The local authority allocated a social worker for S who 
objected strongly to the new plan and stated adamantly that he would rather 
go into local authority foster care than live with his father. By that time, the 
case had been before HHJ Bellamy eight times since he had granted the 
residence order.  He was concerned about the uncertainty for S which was 
likely to be unbearable. To delay the decision any further would be contrary to 
S‟s best interests; it was time to act. He ordered the mother to take S to his 
father's home. If she failed to do so, the Tipstaff would be asked to make the 
transfer.
6
  
S appealed. In giving the leading judgment, Thorpe LJ decided on a 
stepping stone approach, albeit a rapid one, as a more appropriate way 
forward than the immediate removal of S to his father‟s home. S should be 
moved into foster care for three weeks, after which, he would go to live with 
his father. During that time, the father would have the opportunity to have 
direct contact with S, whilst the mother's contact would be limited to short, 
supervised telephone communications. These calls were to be supportive of 
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the ultimate goal of the Court - the transfer of residence to the father. Any 
negativity, either expressed or implied, on the mother‟s part would put an end 
to any further telephone calls with S.
7
 S was shocked by the decision. He 
maintained that “ … he would refuse to see his dad and then the Court would 
see that it was his view.”8 
After a tearful departure between S and his mother, the foster care 
placement went ahead, as did the contact between S and his father. 
Throughout the contact periods S sat with his head in his lap and his hands 
over his ears. He would not engage with his father and made clear that he 
neither wanted to see him nor live with him. The social worker became 
concerned about the effect of the meetings on S, as did the guardian ad litem. 
They thought that he was being put under unacceptable pressure and that the 
demands on him were extreme. His emotional and mental health was at risk. 
The father was made aware of these concerns and agreed that S should return 
to his mother under the auspices of the interim care order. He explained to S 
that he could not bear to see him so unhappy and therefore wanted him to go 
back to live with his mother. S was extremely happy at this outcome and 
returned home. For a while, the local authority remained committed to S‟s 
eventual move to live with his father, and further contact sessions were 
arranged. Yet again S refused to engage.  The local authority social worker 
explained that: 
 
“Throughout the transfer stepping stone process, S has carried out his 
expressed intentions of “nil by mouth” and non-engagement, despite 
significant persuasion, efforts and pressure by professionals, both parents 
and extended families…The Local Authority is clear that it is S who is 
refusing to engage and carry out his acts of self harm, as proof and 
evidence of his intentions if forced to move to live with his father…The 
Local Authority cannot take any further part in direct contact, which S is 
not willing to be part of…At this stage an effective and successful 
transition between the two homes cannot be made without causing S 
significant harm…”9 
 
The guardian agreed with this statement, and it was decided to follow 
another approach at the suggestion of the father. Assistance was sought from 
the Director of the Centre for Separated Families, Ms Woodall. She proposed 
that intensive therapeutic work with the parents and S should take place. 
Thirteen sessions took place, and in addition, there were three direct contact 
sessions between S and his father. The Director detected small but significant 
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signs of progress. She proposed that the work should continue for several 
months and that the plan for a change of residence should be abandoned for 
the present. The expert child psychiatrist forcefully disagreed: 
 
“I do not share Ms Woodall's optimism that further therapeutic 
intervention will succeed…This is a serious and entrenched case of 
alienation…and it has been and remains my opinion that therapy is 
unlikely to succeed in overcoming S's resistance to any form of 
relationship with his father's family. … The difficulty I have is that 
although the local authority is hoping reason will prevail and S will 
come round to accepting the inevitable, I think it is unlikely. The 
delay allows a period when attitudes can become entrenched, 
behaving badly, and further risk of harm occurring…at the end after 
the work and negotiation there will still be the same situation where 
we have to force him to live with his father. Even if he is willing to go 
into foster care, which is a good thing because it avoids a scene at the 
time, the bad thing is that we are not dealing immediately with what is 
ultimately necessary, that is, to make him to go live with his father.”10 
 
The father was dismayed at the possibility of further long-term therapy 
with no indication of when and if the residence order would take effect. His 
wife had recently had a miscarriage; he decided to give up any idea of S living 
with him or even having direct contact with him. HHJ Bellamy welcomed 
this; he believed that in the light of S and his mother‟s conduct over the last 
seven months, it was the right way forward for S. A consent order was made; 
S would reside with his mother, and there would be a supervision order in 
favour of the local authority for one year, which the local authority might seek 
to extend. The father would have indirect contact only, by way of school 
reports and photographs. Any other contact would take place only if S 
requested it, and neither parent would be allowed, without the permission of 
the court, to make any further application in respect of S before his sixteenth 
birthday. After the final consent order was made, the guardian ad litem and 
the social worker emailed HHJ Bellamy to give him details of their final 
meeting with S and his father. At this meeting, the father had read out a letter 
to his son explaining why he had decided not to pursue the residence order. 
The meeting had been extremely difficult for him because he realised that 
there was no further hope of contact with S in the near future. S had told the 
guardian and social worker that he might consider seeing his father in his own 
time and on his own terms. The father was heard sobbing as he left the 
meeting. The failure of the activation of the well thought out residence order, 
in Re S, and its replacement with a consent order raises a number of issues: 
                                                     
10
  Ibid at 1798. 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 198 
the role of European jurisprudence in determining parental contact disputes; 
the problematic nature of parental alienation which is a serious stumbling 
block for the enforcement of parent/child relationships, and how to deal with 
it; the appropriateness of force for children who are implacably opposed to 
contact with a non-resident parent, and finally, the limitations of the family 
justice system in resolving parental contact disputes.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has emphasised the 
importance of Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
(ECHR), the right to family life, and Art 6, the right to a fair trial. Thorpe LJ 
in Re T (a child: contact),
11
 suggested that the methods and levels of 
investigation used in the English courts might not meet the standards required 
by the ECHR.  Munby J in Re D (intractable Contact Dispute : Publicity),
12
 
took a similar approach and said: “We can no longer simply complacently 
assume that our conventional domestic approach to such cases meets the 
standards required by Art 6 and Art 8.”13  
The right under Art 8 includes, unless there are forceful reasons against it, 
a right for the children of separated parents to know, love, and enjoy the 
company, of both their parents. The majority of non-resident parents are 
fathers and it is acknowledged that they have an important role to play in the 
lives of their children; contact between a non-resident parent, of either gender, 
and a child should only be abandoned when there is absolutely no 
alternative.
14
 In Kosmopoulou v Greece,
15
 the ECtHR maintained that “the 
mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other‟s company constitutes a 
fundamental element of family life, even if the relationship between the 
parents has broken down…”16 In Hokkanen v Finland,17 the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that Art 8 provided: “a right for the parent to 
have measures taken with a view to his or her being reunited with the child 
and an obligation for the national authorities to take such action.”18 The 
ECtHR has accepted that the right under Art 6 includes the right to have court 
orders enforced. In Hornsby v Greece,
19
 the Court said that: 
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“ … it would be illusory if a contracting state's domestic legal system 
allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the 
detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that art 6(1) should 
describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants—
proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious—without protecting 
the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe art 6 as being 
concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of 
proceedings would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the 
principle of the rule of law which the contracting states undertook to 
respect when they ratified the Convention. Execution of a judgment 
given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of 
the “trial” for the purposes of art 6…”20 
 
The extent to which a child should be forced to have contact with a parent 
once a court order has been made in that parent‟s favour was considered in  
Ignaccolo-Zenide v Romania.
21
  The ECtHR stated that: “ … any obligation to 
apply coercion can only be limited since the interests, rights and freedoms of 
all concerned must be taken into account, and more particularly the best 
interests of the child and [his or her] rights under Article 8 of the 
Convention.” This view was elaborated in Kosmopoulou v Greece:22 
 
“…the national authorities' obligation to take measures to facilitate 
reunion is not absolute, since the reunion of a parent with children 
who have lived for some time with the other parent may not be able to 
take place immediately and may require preparatory measures to be 
taken. The nature and extent of such preparation will depend on the 
circumstances of each case, but the understanding and co-operation of 
all concerned is always an important ingredient. Whilst national 
authorities must do their utmost to facilitate such co-operation, any 
obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited since the 
interests as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be 
taken into account, and more particularly the best interests of the child 
and his or her rights under art 8 of the Convention. Where contact 
with the parent might appear to threaten those interests or interfere 
with those rights, it is for the national authorities to strike a fair 
balance between them.”23 
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The importance of the rapid conclusion of parental disputes was 
emphasised in Hoppe v Germany,
24
 according to the ECtHR: “… in cases 
concerning a person's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to 
exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may 
result in a de facto determination of the matter.”25 
In Re S, European jurisprudence was hardly mentioned. Can it be said that 
the decision conformed with the views expressed by the ECtHR?  The answer 
must be not entirely. With respect to Art 8, the court certainly recognised the 
right to family life by way of contact and residence for S with his father. 
However, it failed to carry through the activation of its decision. The 
disagreement between the guardian and the social worker, with the views of 
the expert psychiatrist on the best way to proceed with the transfer of 
residence led to confusion, delay, and, in effect, a revisiting of the decision to 
grant the order. It is all too easy for professionals to unpick a residence order 
by the provision of yet more delaying reports. Munby J in Re D,
26
 drew 
attention to the correct role of such professionals which is to facilitate orders 
for residence or contact.  Once the court had accepted that the view of the 
psychiatrist should prevail, should it have been more precipitous in forcing S, 
against his will, to move to his father‟s home? The answer must be a 
resounding yes. Over a four-year period S‟s determination not to relate to his 
father, impliedly helped by his mother, had become deep rooted. By the time 
he had reached the age of twelve, he found himself in a position of power, and 
able to sabotage a court order made in his best interests by means of totally 
negative behaviour.
27
 This outcome is hardly a good message to give to a 
young person, or a resident parent; it suggests that conduct, tantamount to 
blackmail, works. Of course, a child has a right to have his or her views taken 
into account in accordance with his or her age and emotional competence, but 
once the court has done so the child must accept the consequences of that 
decision and be helped to cope with them rather than evade them. S‟s 
immediate distress, which was likely to be short lived according to the 
psychiatrist, would be compensated by the positive benefits on his emotional 
and social maturation which would endure for the rest of his life. Few twelve 
year olds, on the verge of adolescence, have the ability to see the long-term 
consequences of their immediate actions and are not expected to do so. 
Implacable parental alienation seems to have been regarded by the court 
as an implacable problem. As long ago as 1994, Balcombe LJ, in Re J (a 
minor) (contact),
28
 maintained that if a child is violently opposed to contact 
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with a „good‟ non-resident parent, it must be assumed that this stems from the 
resident parent's negative influence, particularly if the child is very young. By 
implication, it would certainly seem to have been true in S‟s case. Parental 
alienation must not be allowed to fester. It should be identified as rapidly as 
possible, and swift action must be taken against the resident parent, even to 
the extent of imposing fines or imprisoning the parent.  Munby J, in Re D,
29
 
suggested that short-term imprisonment, if only for a matter of days, might be 
sufficient to change a recalcitrant parent‟s approach without damaging the 
child.  
The adversarial nature of the court process is so often not appropriate for 
the task of dealing with parental contact disputes.
30
  The majority of family 
court judges believe in the need to move to a non-adversarial approach, 
wherever possible, one which involves mediation and which emphasises 
cooperation between parents to further the best interests of their children.
31
 
Deadlines must be set and delays avoided at all costs. If a case has to go to 
court because greater judicial input is required, there must be judicial 
continuity, and strict judicial control of the process to ensure a swift 
resolution of the dispute.  It may be that the recommendations in the final 
report of the Family Justice Review, which is expected in autumn 2011, if 
acted upon, will redress some of the difficulties inherent in the current system 
which has failed both children and their non-resident parents. Until there is a 
major change in the way parental contact and residence disputes are handled, 
well deserving non-resident parents will remain at risk of remaining reluctant 
absentees in their children‟s lives. A meaningful relationship between them 
will be lost to the long-term detriment of both parent and child.
32
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